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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s, the National Parks and Conservation Association
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Information Act (FOIA) 2 pertaining to concession operations run at
National Parks around the United States. 3 The Association had asked the
Director of the National Park Service to disclose specified documents
pertaining to these operations. 4 Although the Park Service provided some
documents obtained “without extensive research,” it refused to provide the
“results of audits upon the books of several companies operating
concessions in the national parks, the annual financial statements filed with
the Park Service by these concessioners, and other financial information.” 5
The Park Service cited Exemption 4 of FOIA, 6 which protects “trade
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
[that are] privileged or confidential.” 7 The National Parks and Conservation
Association ultimately filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, 8 which held that the “sales statistics, inventories,
holdings, expenses, statements of profits and gross receipts, securities,
liabilities, and salaries and bonuses by position” contained within the
requested materials constituted “confidential” information under
Exemption 4. 9 However, the case would take on significant importance
when, in 1974, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit created a twopart test requiring that, in order to withhold records, the agency must show
disclosure of the requested information would either impair the federal
government’s ability to obtain related information in the future or cause
“substantial harm” to the “competitive position” of the individual or
organization from whom the materials were obtained. 10
Significantly, this test would be used in FOIA Exemption 4 cases for
the next several decades but would be rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court
on June 24, 2019, when the majority held that such a showing of harm was
not necessary under the statutory language of the exemption. 11 The Court
held that Exemption 4 allows a federal agency to withhold “confidential”
financial information when it is “customarily and actually” treated as private
by the owner of the information and is provided to the government under
an assurance of privacy. 12 Observers criticized the ruling for several reasons,
2
3
4
5
6

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 351 F. Supp. 404, 405 (D.D.C. 1972).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 405–06.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2018); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT GUIDE: EXEMPTION 4 (2004), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-editionexemption-4 [https://perma.cc/DWM8-YDUV]. This article uses the 2004 edition as it
provides an extensive discussion of judicial action related to Exemption 4.
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 351 F. Supp. at 404.
Id. at 406, 407.
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019).
7

8
9

10
11
12

Id.
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including that expanding the scope of information protected from
disclosure by Exemption 4 would limit newsgathering, government
transparency, and the free flow of information. 13 Others argued that the
ruling could potentially conflict with the “foreseeable harm standard,” which
states that a federal agency can withhold information only if it “reasonably
foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by [a FOIA]
exemption.” 14
This article joins other observers in arguing that this holding by the
Supreme Court was problematic in several ways, necessitating action by
Congress to clarify the meaning of “confidential” in Exemption 4. More
specifically, this article argues that Congress can, and should, ensure that
Exemption 4 does not prohibit the disclosure of information of public
concern, absent a showing of at least some harm, as Justice Stephen Breyer
argued in his dissenting opinion. 15 By limiting the scope of Exemption 4,
Congress would promote government openness and transparency. Such an
action would also ensure that the news media and others can obtain
information of public interest necessary to hold government agencies
accountable, including in their connections to private businesses.
This article first reviews the legislative history of Exemption 4. It argues
that the question of whether Exemption 4 requires a showing of harm was
not resolved explicitly either way by Congress. Second, this article discusses
key federal court cases that have dealt with Exemption 4, including National
Parks, demonstrating that the two-part test articulated by the D.C. Circuit
has been adopted by most federal circuits in the decades since that ruling.
Third, this article discusses the Supreme Court’s ruling in Food Marketing
Institute v. Argus Leader Media, including the arguments made by both
sides in their briefs before the Court, as well as the facts and opinions in the
case. Fourth, this article joins other commentators in arguing for
Congressional action following Food Marketing Institute. Specifically, it
seeks clarification of whether harm is required under Exemption 4 to ensure
See James Bovard, The Supreme Court Rewrote FOIA into the Freedom FROM
Information
Act,
USA
TODAY
(June
27,
2019),

13

https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/06/27/loss-foia-scotus-government-keepfood-stamp-data-secret-column/1559162001
[https://perma.cc/7NH6-C3FT];
Mark
Fenster, Opinion Analysis: Court Gives Broad Meaning to “Confidential” in FOIA
Exemption for Commercial and Financial Information, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2019, 7:48
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysis-court-gives-broad-meaning-toconfidential-in-foia-exemption-for-commercial-and-financial-information
[https://perma.cc/JUE3-BHE3]; Jessica Gresko, Justices Side with Business, Government in
Information
Fight,
AP
NEWS
(June
24,
2019),
https://apnews.com/44d921a0323448fbaa4372c150eb655e
[https://perma.cc/H3K8T26G].
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A) (2018). More information and commentary on the “foreseeable
harm standard” is provided at infra notes 117–23.
See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2368 (2019) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
14

15
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the free flow of information in cases like Food Marketing Institute, where
the requested records contain only proprietary or secret commercial
information but also raise significant matters of public concern. Finally, this
article highlights a piece of legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate in June
2019, 16 demonstrating that Congressional action is not only needed, but
possible.
II. HISTORY
The following sections will provide key background information,
including a brief history of FOIA, the legislative history of Exemption 4, and
a discussion of key circuit court rulings that address this exemption,
particularly related to whether it requires a showing of harm to prevent
disclosure of requested materials.

A. Brief History of FOIA
FOIA was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966
and took effect on July 4, 1967, with the intention of creating a presumption
of public access to the records of any federal agency. 17 Under the statute,
agencies are generally required to disclose records unless they fall under
one of nine exemptions, including Exemption 4. 18
FOIA has undergone several amendments, including most recently in
2016 when President Barack Obama signed the FOIA Improvement Act of
2016. 19 This amendment promoted greater public access to government
records that were frequently requested, and created a single online portal
for FOIA requests, among other provisions. 20 The most lauded change,
which had been proposed by previous administrations, including that of

Open and Responsive Government Act of 2019, S. 2220, 116th Cong. (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2220/text [https://perma.cc/P49CEQHS].
See generally History of FOIA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency/history-of-foia [https://perma.cc/TSE7-SUSF] (last
visited Sept. 27, 2019); Joan M. Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under
the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1261, 1261–84 (1969); SUZANNE J.
PIOTROWSKI, GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE PATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM (2007) (discussing the implementation of FOIA); MICHAEL R. LEMOV, PEOPLE’S
WARRIOR: JOHN MOSS AND THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMER
RIGHTS (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2011) (discussing Congressman John Moss’s
efforts to pass FOIA).
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2018).
FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-85, 130 Stat. 538.
Scott Memmel, President Obama Signs Law Making Significant Amendments to the
Freedom of Information Act, 21 SILHA BULLETIN 10 (Summer 2016),
http://silha.umn.edu/assets/pdf/2016-summer-bulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A4D-PLVK].
16

17

18
19
20
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President Bill Clinton, 21 was the explicit requirement that federal agencies
must consider releasing records under a “presumption of openness”
standard, rather than presuming government information is secret. 22 The
standard therefore “place[d] the burden on agencies to justify withholding
information, instead of on the requester to justify release.” 23 Under this
standard, agencies may withhold requested records only when “foreseeable
harm” could be caused by the release. 24
One reason for the passage of the amendment was a memorandum
issued in October 2001 by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft in the wake
of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 25 Among other provisions, the
memorandum for the “heads of all federal departments and agencies”
ordered the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to defend all decisions to
withhold records, “unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an
unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect
other important records.” 26 The memorandum also stated that “[a]ny
discretionary decision by [a federal agency] to disclose information
protected under FOIA should be made only after full and deliberate
consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy
interests that could be implicated by disclosure of the information.” 27

B. Legislative History
Congress’ motivations behind FOIA Exemption 4—in particular, what
kinds of information Congress intended to protect—are not easily
discernible. Although one court has characterized FOIA’s legislative history
as “tortured, not to say obfuscating,” 28 certain benchmarks and objectives of
the bill are relatively clear.
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE: PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ISSUE
NEW FOIA POLICY MEMORANDA (Jan. 1, 1993), https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foiaupdate-president-and-attorney-general-issue-new-foia-policy-memoranda
[https://perma.cc/D7Q3-5TJE].
Memmel, supra note 20, at 10.
Id. (quoting Press Release, U.S. House Comm. on Oversight and Reform, Chaffetz,
Cummings, Issa Applaud Passage of Bipartisan FOIA Reform Bill (June 13, 2016),
https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/chaffetz-cummings-issa-applaud-passage-ofbipartisan-foia-reform-bill [https://perma.cc/L66D-V3ND]).
Id. More information on the “foreseeable harm standard” is provided at infra notes 120–
126.
FOIA Project Staff, Defensive Standards Hinder FOIA Openness, FOIA PROJECT (Mar.
1,
2012),
http://foiaproject.org/2012/03/01/defensive-standards-hinder-foia-openness/
[https://perma.cc/2BZL-LZ2L].
Id. (citing John Ashcroft, Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and
Agencies
(Oct.
12,
2001),
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB84/Ashcroft%20Memorandum.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9CYP-MFPC]).
Ashcroft, supra note 26.
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1978).
21

22
23

24

25

26

27
28
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It took two sessions of Congress to pass what would eventually become
FOIA. The first iteration of the legislation, introduced in the Senate in June
1963, 29 did not include Exemption 4, which was later added as part of an
amendment, along with other exemptions. 30 The original statutory language
of Exemption 4 permitted agencies to withhold “trade secrets and other
information obtained from the public and customarily privileged or
confidential.” 31 One Senate report states that the exemption was intended to
“protect the confidentiality of information which is obtained by the
Government through questionnaires or other inquiries, but which would
customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was
obtained.” 32 The report lists various types of information that would be
covered by the exemption, including sales data, lists of inventories and
customers, and processes involved in manufacturing. 33 The Senate passed
that version of the legislation in July 1964, 34 but the House failed to take up
the bill before adjourning for the session, so the legislation died. 35
The Senate then took up FOIA the following session and passed a
version of the bill that was substantially the same as the previous one, but
with some changes, including two modifications to the statutory language of
Exemption 4. 36 Instead of “trade secrets and other information obtained
from the public and customarily privileged or confidential,” the amended
exemption covered “trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from the public and privileged or confidential.” 37 The words “other
information” were replaced with “commercial or financial information.” 38
The word “customarily” also was omitted. 39 No reasons were given for these
changes. 40 The Senate report concluded: “The committee feels that this bill,
as amended, would establish a much-needed policy of disclosure, while
balancing the necessary interests of confidentiality.” 41
A subsequent House report from 1966 offers additional context for
the purpose of the modifications, stating that the exemption would cover
SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
93D CONG., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS,
CASES, ARTICLES 8 (Comm. Print 1974).
S. REP. NO. 88-1219 (1964).
29

30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Id.

SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
93D CONG., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS,
CASES, ARTICLES 8 (Comm. Print 1974).
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
34

35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 10 (1965).
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“information which is given to an agency in confidence, since a citizen must
be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, where the Government
has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or information
which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations.” 42 The report
also added another example of information that would be covered under
Exemption 4: information submitted to the government about negotiations
between labor and management. 43
The Senate passed the second iteration of the legislation in October
1965, further augmenting the description of Exemption 4. 44 According to
the Congressional Record, the exemption would cover “any commercial,
technical, and financial data submitted by an applicant or a borrower to a
lending agency in connection with any loan application or loan.” 45 The bill
subsequently passed the House in June 1966. 46
There is evidence that lawmakers were made aware of concerns about
disclosure of commercial and financial information. In testimony submitted
to Congress in connection with the 1963 FOIA bill, the DOJ expressed
apprehension about “the large body of the Government's information
involving private business data.” 47 Disclosing such information, the DOJ
said, could harm competitors and chill cooperation between industry and
governmental regulators. 48 Congress did not formally respond to this
concern.
Congressional intent on whether there must be a showing of harm is
demonstrated by the Food Marketing Institute’s (FMI’s) and the Argus
Leader’s differing interpretations of the contemporaneous Senate and
House reports. FMI’s brief before the Supreme Court cited the Senate and
the House Reports “accompanying the bill that became FOIA.” 49 Based on
the Senate Report explanation, the brief argued that Exemption 4 “gives
federal agencies discretion to withhold non-governmental commercial or
financial information that ‘would customarily not be released to the public
42

H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1966).

43

Id.

44

111 CONG. REC. S26820, at 26823 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1965).

45

Id.

SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
93D CONG., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS,
CASES, ARTICLES 8 (Comm. Print 1974).
46

Freedom of Information: Hearing on S. 1666 and S. 1663 (in part) Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 199 (1963)
47

(statement of Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Department
of Justice).
48

Id.

Brief for Petitioner at 22, Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019)
(No.
18-481),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18481/88748/20190215204958915_1.%20Brief%20on%20the%20Merits.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73VS-FLCP] [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
49
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by the person from whom it was obtained.’” 50 FMI claimed that the House
Report’s definition was “nearly identical: Exemption 4 ‘exempts such
material if it would not customarily be made public by the person from
whom it was obtained by the Government.’” 51 The brief, therefore, argued
that Exemption 4 applies to all information falling under these definitions,
“not just information whose disclosure would ‘cause substantial competitive
harm.’” 52
Conversely, the brief filed by the Argus Leader disputed FMI’s use of
the Senate and House Reports regarding the drafting of FOIA. 53 The brief
argued that FOIA’s legislative history “is notoriously flawed.” 54 Additionally,
the brief contended that FMI’s reliance on a single statement in the reports—
that information is “confidential” if it “customarily not be released to the
public by the person from whom it was obtained”—was a “snippet . . .
recycled from reports issued on the FOIA bill from the prior year, which
unlike the final law, expressly used the word ‘customarily,’” a word that was
later removed from the bill before it was passed. 55 The brief explained that
the Senate “simply failed to alter its earlier report,” and “the House
committee seven months later copied most of the Senate committee
report.” 56
Some of the motivation behind Exemption 4 is made clear in the
Senate and House reports. These documents demonstrate that Congress
intended to protect financial and commercial information given to the
government in confidence, with the intention that the government would
not disclose such materials to the public. 57 The reports provided several
examples, ranging from sales data to loan applications to labor negotiations.
However, what is less clear from the legislative history is whether
Congress meant for federal agencies to also show some level of harm to
justify withholding documents under Exemption 4. Not only is this not
explicitly discussed in the congressional documents, it is also an issue of
contemporaneous debate, including before, and by, the Supreme Court.
50
51

Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965)).
Id. at 23 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1965)). The brief added that the report “also

specifies that the exemption applies to ‘information which is given to an agency in confidence,
since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government,’ and ‘where the Government has
obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or information which it receives.’” Id.
Id. at 22.
Brief for Respondent at 51, Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356
(2019)
(No.
18-481),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18481/92325/20190318174331610_190309%20Brief%20for%20E-Filing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9NK4-FE2G] [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
Id. at 51 (citing Kenneth C. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U.
CHI. L. REV. 761, 789–90 (1967); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.
546, 568 (2005); Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 459 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
Id. at 52.
Id. (citing Davis, supra note 54, at 790).
See 111 CONG. REC. S26820, at 26823 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1965).
52
53

54

55
56
57
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Accordingly, it is unclear, based on the legislative history alone, whether
Congress meant for harm to be part of Exemption 4. Congress should,
therefore, resolve this question that it left open more than four decades ago.

C. Circuit Rulings Regarding the Substantial Harm Test and Exemption 4
The DOJ has noted that “[b]y far, most Exemption 4 litigation has
focused on whether or not requested information is ‘confidential’ for
purposes of Exemption 4.” 58 The DOJ’s Freedom of Information Act
Guide, published in 2004, explained that in the early years of FOIA, courts
determined the application of Exemption 4 on “whether there was a
promise of confidentiality by the government to the submitting party, or
whether the information was of the type not customarily released to the
public by the submitter.” 59
This changed in 1974 when the D.C. Circuit ruled in National Parks
& Conservation Assn. v. Morton that, in addition to the requirements set
forth in Exemption 4, a “court must also be satisfied that non-disclosure is
justified by the legislative purpose which underlies the exemption.” 60 The
court, therefore, created a two-part test to determine whether information
is, in fact, “confidential” under Exemption 4. The court held that:
[A] commercial or financial matter is “confidential” for purposes
of the exemption if disclosure of the information is likely to have
either of the following effects: (1) to impair the Government's
ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to
cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person
from whom the information was obtained. 61
Most recently, in its 2001 ruling in Contract Freighters, Inc. v.
Secretary of U.S. Department of Transportation, the Eighth Circuit noted
that it, and almost every federal circuit court in addition to the D.C. Circuit,
had adopted the National Parks two-part test, 62 including the First, 63

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7.
Id. (citing GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC,
450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471
(D.D.C. 1972)).
Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct. at 2363–64 (citing Nat’l Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton,
498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 498 F.2d at 770.
Contract Freighters, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 260 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir.
2001); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7. The DOJ’s “Freedom of Information
Act Guide” provides an extensive discussion of how the different circuits have applied the
test on a case-by-case basis. The guide also provides extensive discussions on other court
applications of Exemption 4, though those are less relevant for the purposes of this article.
58
59

60

61
62

Id.
9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 721
F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1983).

63
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Second, 64 Third, 65 Fourth, 66 Fifth, 67 Seventh, 68 Ninth, 69 and Tenth Circuits. 70
The Eighth Circuit ultimately applied the National Parks test, finding that
Contract Freighters, a freight logistics and motor carrier company, needed
to demonstrate that “substantial competitive harm was likely to result from
disclosure” of “certain financial data submitted to the Department of
Transportation (DOT).” 71
In its FOIA guide, the DOJ explained that in Critical Mass Energy
Project v. NRC, the D.C. Circuit added a “third prong” to the test to
determine whether “other governmental interests—such as compliance and
program effectiveness,” were at stake. 72 The DOJ subsequently issued policy
guidance following the ruling in 1992, focusing particularly on “intrinsically
valuable” records, namely those that “are significant not for their content,
but as valuable commodities which can be sold in the marketplace.” 73
However, the majority of Exemption 4 cases, as would be the case in
Food Marketing Institute, have “involved the competitive harm prong of the
test for confidentiality established in National Parks,” 74 with courts tending
“to resolve issues of competitive harm on a case-by-case basis rather than by
establishing general guidelines.” 75
III. FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE V. ARGUS LEADER MEDIA
On June 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court held in a 6-3 ruling that
Exemption 4 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), allows a federal agency to
withhold “confidential” commercial or financial information when it is
“customarily and actually” treated as private by the owner of the information
and is provided to the government under an assurance of privacy. 76 In an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen Breyer
Cont’l Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. S.E.C., 566 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1977).
OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 162 n. 24, 167–68 (3d Cir.
2000).
Hercules, Inc. v. Marsh, 839 F.2d 1027, 1029 (4th Cir. 1988).
Cont’l Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 519 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir. 1975).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1398 (7th Cir. 1984).
GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 1994).
Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 944 (10th Cir. 1990).
Contract Freighters Inc. v. Sec’y of United States Dep’t of Transp., 260 F.3d 858, 859–60
(8th Cir. 2001).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7 (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d
871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992); FOIA Update, Vol. XIV, No. 2, at 7 (“Exemption 4 Under
Critical Mass: Step-By-Step Decision-making”); National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
Id. (citing FOIA Update, Vol. VI, No. 1, at 3–4 (“OIP Guidance: Protecting Intrinsic
Commercial Value”).
Id. (citing Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 498 F.2d at 770).
64
65

66
67
68
69
70
71

72

73

74
75

Id.

76

Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2359 (2019).
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contended that Exemption 4 should require a showing of at least some
harm. 77

A. Facts
The case arose when the Argus Leader, a newspaper in Sioux Falls,
South Dakota, filed a FOIA request for data collected by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) regarding the national food-stamp
program, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). 78 The
newspaper was investigating the practice of “trafficking,” in which “SNAP
recipients sell their benefits for cash at a discount to food retailers,” with
some estimates stating that “approximately ten percent of participating
retailers engage in trafficking.” 79
The FOIA request sought names and addresses of all retail stores that
participated in SNAP, as well as each store’s redemption data from 2005 to
2010, referred to as “store-level SNAP data.” 80 As the Argus Leader
explained in its brief before the Supreme Court, the redemption data is not
information retailers are required to submit to the USDA. 81 Instead, the
USDA “automatically obtains that information when SNAP transactions are
electronically processed.” 82
The USDA released the names and addresses but refused to disclose
the store-level SNAP data. 83 The USDA cited Exemption 4, which,
according to the DOJ guidance, protects two types of records: “trade secrets
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person [that is]
privileged or confidential.” 84
In 2016, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota held
a two-day bench trial to determine whether disclosure of the store-level
SNAP data would cause substantial competitive harm to participating stores
and retailers. 85 During the trial, the USDA testified that “retailers closely
guard store-level SNAP data and that disclosure would threaten stores’

77
78

Id. at 2366–69 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2361.

Argus Leader Media v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 740 F.3d 1172, 1174 (8th Cir. 2014) (adding
that an “estimated $858 million per year is ‘trafficked’”).

79

80

Id.

81

Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 19.
Id. at 19 (adding that the “USDA itself, ‘not any retailer, generates the information, and the

82

underlying data is ‘obtained’ from third-party payment processors, not from individual
retailers”); see also Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334 (2018),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr2/text [https://perma.cc/FC6X-KQUF].
Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 21.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(2000)).
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2361 (2019) (citing Argus Leader
Media v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 224 F. Supp. 3d 827, 832–35 (D.S.D. 2016)).
83
84

85
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competitive positions,” in part because store-level SNAP data “could create
a windfall for competitors” for three reasons:
[1.] Stores with high SNAP redemptions could see increased
competition for SNAP customers from existing competitors,
[2.] new market entrants could use SNAP data to determine
where to build their stores, and
[3.] [competitors could use SNAP data to determine] a rival
retailer’s overall sales and develop strategies to win some of that
business too. 86
The Argus Leader countered that such harm would not be
“substantial,” and the district court agreed. 87
The Food Marketing Institute (FMI), a trade association representing
grocery retailers, intervened in the case and appealed the decision to the
Eighth Circuit, which held that the district court “did not clearly err in
finding SNAP redemption data not exempt from disclosure under FOIA
exemption for confidential commercial information.” 88 The Eighth Circuit
rejected FMI’s argument that the court “should discard the ‘substantive
competitive harm’ test in favor of the ordinary public meaning of the
statutory term ‘confidential.’” 89 The court further held that “the evidence
[did] not support a finding” that releasing the contested data was “likely to
cause substantial competitive harm.” 90

B. Arguments
On February 15, 2019, FMI filed its brief before the Supreme Court. 91
The brief first argued that the word “‘[c]onfidential’ is an unambiguous word
with a longstanding, ordinary meaning,” 92 namely, “something that is private
and not publicly disclosed.” 93 The brief further argued that in U.S.
Department of Justice v. Landano, the Supreme Court had held that the
word “confidential” in Exemption 7 of FOIA 94 had the “plain meaning [of]

86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2362 (citing Argus Leader Media v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 889 F.3d 914, 915

(8th Cir. 2018)).
Id. at 2359.
89
90
91
92
93

Argus Leader Media, 889 F.3d at 916.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 49.
Id. at 12.
Id.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (2018) (“[R]ecords or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
information . . . could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source,
including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which
furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information
compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or

94

2020]

MORE “SUBSTANTIAL HARM” THAN GOOD

509

private information that is not publicly disclosed,” 95 and that there was no
requirement to show harm from the disclosure of the information at issue
to justify denying the request. The brief further argued that Congress “chose
not to give ‘confidential’ a different definition for FOIA; it chose to use an
ordinary term in common usage.” 96
Second, the brief contended that the test crafted by the D.C. Circuit
was “atextual,” 97 meaning it “disregarded Exemption 4’s plain text.” 98 The
brief argued that the “atextual test is unworkable, unduly complex, and
unpredictable.” 99 The brief added, “There is no serious argument that
Congress itself endorsed a reading that so departs from the words that it
used. All that the lower courts have left is circuit-level stare decisis, which of
course does not bind [the Supreme] Court.” 100
Finally, FMI contended that the data the Argus Leader requested “fits
easily within the ordinary definition of ‘confidential.’” 101 The brief reasoned
that the newspaper had “not disputed that retailers carefully safeguard this
information or that USDA represented to retailers that it would keep such
information confidential pursuant to the agency’s longstanding policies.” 102
The brief argued that the information was, therefore, “not subject to
mandatory disclosure under FOIA, and USDA may withhold that
information.” 103 The brief added that even if the National Parks test was
applied, there was “a reasonable possibility that disclosure might harm
commercial or financial interests.” 104
The Argus Leader’s brief contended that FMI lacked Article III
standing under the U.S. Constitution because the Solicitor General’s brief
to the Court noted that the USDA had “decided it would disclose the
requested government-spending records here, no matter how this Court
rules on Exemption 4, so long as it has discretion to do so.” 105 Accordingly,
the Argus Leader argued that the petitioner could not “show a favorable
by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information
furnished by a confidential source . . . .”).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 49, at 19–21 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508
U.S. 165, 173 (1993); Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 356 (1982); Gray v. Netherland,
518 U.S. 152, 182 (1996); United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 534
(1961); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954)). The brief further argued that the
Supreme Court gave “‘personal privacy’ the same plain meaning in both Exemptions 6 and
7(C).” Id. (quoting FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 407–08 (2011)).
Id. at 3.
95

96
97
98
99

100
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 8.
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ruling on Exemption 4 would likely prevent USDA from releasing the
requested records. Exemption 4 does not forbid the Government from
releasing anything. It simply provides the Government with discretion.” 106
Second, the Argus Leader argued that for “over 40 years, the courts of
appeals have read [Exemption 4] to require a showing of likely competitive
harm,” meaning there was “no basis to discard that uniform
interpretation.” 107 Third, the Argus Leader contended that because
Congress did not define “confidential” commercial information, the Court
needed to look “to dictionaries, the common law, and other sources of
interpretive guidance.” 108 The Argus Leader’s brief argued that dictionaries
“are not dispositive, but the common law is.” 109 The brief explained that
when FOIA was enacted, the common law “protected against disclosure of
confidential business information if the disclosure would cause competitive
harm.” 110 According to the brief, “[i]n other words, ‘confidential commercial
information’ was a term of art at common law meaning business information
that would cause competitive harm if disclosed.” 111
The Argus Leader’s brief further argued that Congress would have
looked for the definition of trade secrets in the first Restatement of Torts,
which referred to “trade secrets and other confidential commercial
information” as “non-public business information, disclosure of which
would . . . likely cause competitive harm if released.” 112 According to the
Argus Leader, courts “have long embraced this same usage. They have often
addressed both ‘trade secrets’ and ‘confidential business information’ in the
same breath to refer to all non-public commercial information that would
likely cause competitive harm, and thus be tortious, if disclosed.” 113 The
brief therefore concluded that when drafting Exemption 4, Congress meant
for there to be a showing of harm if disclosure was to be denied.
Fourth, the Argus Leader asserted that the longstanding competitive
harm standard “must be retained [because] Congress has reenacted the text
and ratified the standard 60 times.” 114 The brief contended that “Congress,
well aware of the uniformly adopted judicial construction, has repeatedly
ratified the longstanding competitive-harm standard by incorporating
Exemption 4 and its text into 60 other provisions across the U.S. Code.” 115
Finally, the brief argued that FMI’s “sweeping interpretation of
‘confidential’ would undermine FOIA’s core objective of, as this Court has
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29 (citing Restatement of Torts § 757, cmt. B (Am. Law Inst. 1939)).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 25.
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put it, allowing the public to learn ‘what the Government is up to.’” 116 The
Argus Leader continued:
It would make it far more difficult for the press and public to
uncover evidence of government waste, fraud, and dereliction of
duty. That is because the public must examine some data
submitted to the Government (e.g., contractor prices) to know
what the Government is spending public money on. The public
must also be able to examine what private parties submit to the
Government (e.g., compliance reports) to assess how and
whether the Government is wielding its expansive regulatory
powers. 117
Among several other amicus briefs, 118 the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press (RCFP) and thirty-six media organizations filed a brief
in support of the Argus Leader. 119 The brief argued that the National Parks
standard was consistent with the “foreseeable harm standard,” codified as
part of the 2016 amendments to FOIA. 120 This provision states that a federal
agency may withhold information under this standard only if it “reasonably
foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption
described in subsection (b); or . . . disclosure is prohibited by law.” 121 The
standard further requires that agencies “(I) consider whether partial
disclosure of information is possible whenever the agency determines that a
full disclosure of a requested record is not possible; and (II) take reasonable
steps necessary to segregate and release nonexempt information.” 122
The brief cited the First Circuit’s ruling in 9 to 5 Organization for

Women Office Workers v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, in which the court “presciently described the ‘principle to be
derived from National Parks[], and the cases which have followed it.’”
123

124

Accordingly, the court argued that “[i]nformation will not be regarded as
confidential under Exemption 4 unless it can be demonstrated that
disclosure will harm a specific interest that Congress sought to protect by
enacting the exemption.” 125 The brief argued that the “plain text of the
116
117

Id. at 11.
Id.

Among the parties that filed briefs were Retail Litigation Center, Inc., Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, the Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Freedom of Information Act and First Amendment Scholars, and several others.
Brief of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 1–2, Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) (No.
18-481),
https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-03-25-FMI-v-ArgusLeader.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C52-SM98] [hereinafter Brief of Reporters Committee].
Id. at 5; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A) (2018).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A).
118

119

120
121
122

Id.

123

721 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1983).
Brief of Reporters Committee, supra note 119, at 18.
Id. at 19 (citing 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers, 721 F.2d at 9).
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foreseeable harm standard requires the government to demonstrate (1)
harm to an interest protected by a FOIA exemption—here, the competitive
position of a third party—and (2) a reasonable likelihood that harm will
occur.” 126
RCFP and the media organizations also argued that there is a “strong
public interest in access to records regarding expenditures of public
funds.” 127 The brief continued, “FOIA is a powerful tool used by journalists,
news organizations, and the public to monitor how the government spends
tax dollars,” such as previously using “SNAP data to determine which
private companies obtain the greatest benefits from government subsidies.
Similar records also allow the public to understand which companies the
government selects for lucrative contracts.” 128

C. Justice Gorsuch’s Opinion
Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court. He first contended that the Eighth Circuit, among other appellate
courts, had “engrafted onto Exemption 4 a so-called ‘competitive harm’ test,
under which commercial information cannot be deemed ‘confidential’
unless disclosure is ‘likely . . . to cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the person from whom the information was obtained.’” 129
Second, Justice Gorsuch held that FMI had Article III standing under
the U.S. Constitution to pursue the appeal, reasoning that although the issue
before the Court was whether its member retailers would suffer “substantial
competitive harm,” there was no doubt that the disclosure of the SNAP data
would cause “some financial injury.” 130
Third, Justice Gorsuch held that because FOIA does not define the
term “confidential,” the Court must determine what the term’s “ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning” was when Congress enacted FOIA in
Id. at 19–20 (“The 2016 amendments to the Act include an unambiguous direction from
Congress that a showing of foreseeable harm to an interest protected by a discretionary FOIA
exemption must be made before records may be withheld. Thus, even if the Court does not
adopt the National Parks test for Exemption 4 now, current and future FOIA requests will
be governed by an essentially, if not entirely, identical standard. Indeed, as noted above, the
Argus Leader can simply file a new FOIA request today that would require the Food and
Drug Administration to apply the foreseeable harm standard.”). The brief makes several
additional arguments, including that the public had a “strong interest in understanding how
the government spends tax dollars and contracts with private parties,” among other claims.
Id. at 20. For more information on how federal courts have interpreted the foreseeable harm
standard in relation to Exemption 4, see Al-Amyn Sumar, Unpacking FOIA’s “Foreseeable
Harm” Standard, COMM. LAW., Winter 2020, at 15, 18–20.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2361 (2019) (emphasis added)
(citing Argus Leader Media v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 889 F.3d 915, 915 (2018)).
Id. at 2362 (internal quotations omitted).
126

127
128
129

130
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1966. 131 Justice Gorsuch concluded based on definitions in “contemporary
dictionaries” that the term meant “private” or “secret” and must meet two
conditions, including that the information “communicated to another
remains confidential whenever it is customarily kept private . . . by the
person imparting it” and that the information “might be considered
confidential only if the party receiving it provides some assurance that it will
remain secret.” 132 Taken together, the two conditions posit that the financial
information is “customarily and actually” treated as private.
Justice Gorsuch found that FMI had met the first condition because its
retailers “customarily do not disclose store-level SNAP data or make it
publicly available ‘in any way.’” 133 Justice Gorsuch held that the retailers had
“clearly” satisfied the second condition: “Can privately held information
lose its confidential character for purposes of Exemption 4 if it’s
communicated to the government without assurances that the government
will keep it private?” 134 He reasoned that the government, to induce retailers
to participate in SNAP and provide store-level information to the USDA,
“has long promised them that it will keep their information private.” 135
Therefore, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the data at issue qualified as
“confidential” data under Exemption 4. 136
Fourth, Justice Gorsuch turned to the “substantial competitive harm”
requirement articulated by the D.C. Circuit in National Parks and by several
additional federal circuit courts. 137 He wrote that the Court could not
“approve such a casual disregard of the rules of statutory interpretation” and
refused to “alter FOIA’s plain terms on the strength only of arguments from
legislative history.” 138 Justice Gorsuch called the D.C. Circuit’s approach a
“relic from a ‘bygone era of statutory construction,’” because, among other
reasons, the appellate court had “relied heavily on statements from
witnesses in congressional hearings years earlier on a different bill that was
never enacted into law.” 139
Finally, Justice Gorsuch rejected several arguments by the Argus
Leader attempting to salvage the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, including
that Congress had “effectively ratified its understanding of the term
‘confidential’ by enacting similar phrases in other statutes in the years since
that case was decided.” 140 Justice Gorsuch held that although “the ratification
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id. (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2363 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2363–64 (citing Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767

(D.C. Cir. 1974)).
Id. at 2364.
138
139
140

Id.
Id. at 2365.
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canon can sometimes prove a useful interpretive tool,” 141 Congress had
never “reenacted” Exemption 4, meaning its use of similar language in other
statutes after the D.C. Circuit’s ruling “tells us nothing about Congress’s
understanding of the language it enacted in Exemption 4 in 1966.” 142
The Argus Leader had argued that the “substantial competitive harm”
requirement should be adopted because FOIA exemptions are to be
“narrowly construed,” 143 meaning its scope does not cover more records
than Congress intended. Justice Gorsuch rejected this argument as well,
reasoning that the Court had “no license to give [statutory] exemption[s]
anything but a fair reading.” 144
Thus, Justice Gorsuch concluded that “[a]t least where commercial or
financial information is both customarily and actually treated as private by
its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of privacy,”
the information is “‘confidential’ within the meaning of Exemption 4.” 145 He
continued, “Because the store-level SNAP data at issue here is confidential
under that construction, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.” 146

D. Justice Breyer’s Opinion
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen
Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor,
agreed with the two conditions set out by Justice Gorsuch but added that
“there is a third: Release of such information must also cause genuine harm
to the owner’s economic or business interests.” 147
Justice Breyer wrote that he agreed that the D.C. Circuit’s test in
National Parks “[went] too far.” 148 He reasoned that he could “find nothing
in FOIA’s language, purposes, or history that imposes so stringent a
requirement,” which would create several problems, including “long,
onerous court proceedings” to determine whether something qualifies as
“substantial.” 149 However, Justice Breyer disagreed “with the majority’s
decision to jump to the opposite conclusion, namely, that Exemption 4
imposes no ‘harm’ requirement whatsoever.” 150
141
142
143
144

Id.
Id. at 2366.
Id.
Id. (citing Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018)) (internal

quotations omitted).
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2366–67 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2367.
Id.
Id. at 2368.
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Justice Breyer reasoned that the word “confidential” sometimes
referred to, “at least in the national security context, . . . information the
disclosure of which would cause harm.” 151 Second, he contended that the
majority’s reading of Exemption 4 was “at odds with [the] principles” of
FOIA, including that the mandate of the statute is the “broad disclosure of
Government records.” 152 He continued, “The whole point of the FOIA is to
give the public access to information it cannot otherwise obtain. So the fact
that private actors have ‘customarily and actually treated’ commercial
information as secret cannot be enough to justify nondisclosure.” 153 Justice
Breyer added,
[A] statute designed to take from the government the power to
unilaterally decide what information the public can view put such
determinative weight on the government’s preference for secrecy.
. . . I fear the majority’s reading will deprive the public of
information for reasons no better than convenience, skittishness,
or bureaucratic inertia. 154
Therefore, Justice Breyer concluded that “Exemption 4 can be
satisfied where, in addition to the conditions set out by the majority, release
of commercial or financial information will cause genuine harm to an
owner’s economic or business interests.” 155

E. Commentary about the Ruling
Following the decision, several observers expressed concern with the
majority’s ruling, particularly its impact on the news media’s ability to cover
matters of public interest. Argus Leader news director, Cory Myers, said in
a June 17, 2019, statement that he was “disappointed” in the outcome of the
case. 156 “This is a massive blow to the public’s right to know how its tax
dollars are being spent, and who is benefiting,” he said. “Regardless, we will
continue to fight for government openness and transparency, as always.” 157
Maribel Perez Wadsworth, president of the USA Today Network, the
parent company of the Argus Leader, also expressed disappointment in the
ruling. 158 “[The court’s decision] effectively gives businesses relying on
taxpayer dollars the ability to decide for themselves what data the public will
Id.
Id. (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 2369.
Bovard, supra note 13.
See Jonathan Ellis and Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Limits Access to Government
Records in Loss for Argus Leader, Part of the USA TODAY Network, USA TODAY (June
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

24, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/24/freedom-informationact-supreme-court-rules-south-dakota-case/1475089001/ [https://perma.cc/T7Z2-KMEU].
Gresko, supra note 13.
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see about how that money is spent,” she said in a statement. 159 “This is a step
backward for openness and a misreading of the very purpose of the
Freedom of Information Act.” 160
In a June 24, 2019, SCOTUSblog post, Mark Fenster, the Stephen C.
O’Connell Chair at the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida,
predicted that the ruling would “frustrate news media, watchdogs and
competitors who will be less likely to have their FOIA requests met.” 161
Fenster added that “the majority never explained that the Argus Leader
submitted its FOIA request as part of its investigation into SNAP-related
fraud” and that the investigation would “now have to proceed without access
to the SNAP data.” 162
In a June 24, 2019, tweet, Argus Leader reporter, Jonathan Ellis,
agreed, writing, “[T]oday six members of the U.S. Supreme Court used it
as a vehicle to wipe out more than 40 years of established #FOIA
precedent.” 163 In a tweet on the same day, RCFP attorney, Adam A.
Marshall, also criticized the ruling, similarly writing that the Supreme Court
had “wiped out” forty-five years of precedent related to Exemption 4, citing
the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in National Parks. 164
IV. DISCUSSION
This article joins other commentators in arguing that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Food Market Institute fails to protect important public
interests in government transparency, newsgathering, and the free flow of
information. In particular, Congressional action is needed to clarify key
questions related to Exemption 4, as well as to ensure that the Exemption
does not limit disclosure of information more than is necessary. In fact, a
piece of legislation, already introduced by Congress, 165 would help resolve
the concerns that need to be addressed, demonstrating that Congressional
action is not only necessary, but also possible.

159
160

Id.
Id.

161

Fenster, supra note 13.

162

Id.

Jonathan Ellis (@argusjellis), TWITTER (June 24, 2019, 7:48 AM),
https://twitter.com/argusjellis/status/1143169087499055105?s=20
[https://perma.cc/WUV7-68VB].
Adam A. Marshall (@a_marshall_plan), TWITTER (June 24, 2019, 7:53 AM),
https://twitter.com/a_marshall_plan/status/1143170206157758465 [https://perma.cc/RP6CZMMC].
See Open and Responsive Government Act of 2019, S. 2220, 116th Cong. (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2220/text [https://perma.cc/P49CEQHS]
163

164
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A. Necessary Congressional Action Related to the Harm Requirement
Based on original research into the legislative history of FOIA
Exemption 4, it is clear that a primary motivation behind the exemption was
to protect information provided to a federal agency that was meant to be
kept in confidence by the government. 166 As a House Report explained in
1966, Exemption 4 was included in the revised version of FOIA to protect
“information which is given to an agency in confidence, since a citizen must
be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, where the Government
has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or information
which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations.” 167 Such
materials include sales data, lists of inventories and customers, and
processes involved in manufacturing, 168 as well as “any commercial,
technical, and financial data submitted by an applicant or a borrower to a
lending agency in connection with any loan application or loan” 169 and
information submitted to the government about negotiations between labor
and management. 170
However, Congressional documents stop short of clarifying a key
debate that took place before the Supreme Court: whether Exemption 4
requires a showing of harm, as federal circuit courts have required through
the National Parks two-part test originally introduced by the D.C. Circuit in
in 1974. At best, one could argue either that Congress implicitly required,
or did not require, such a showing, as demonstrated by FMI’s and Argus
Leader’s briefs before the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the disagreement
between the majority and dissenting justices in the case further show that it
remains unsettled whether Congress intended for harm to be required
under Exemption 4.
Put simply, the legislative history of the exemption is ambiguous and
fails to resolve this key question. Congress has the ability to do so in the
wake of Food Marketing Institute. Congressional action is necessary to limit
the scope of Exemption 4 of FOIA by applying the reasoning of Justice
Breyer, requiring that there be at least some requirement of harm caused
by the disclosure of trade secrets to justify the withholding of records. 171

See H. R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1966); 111 CONG. REC. S. 26820, at S. 26823 (daily
ed. Oct. 13, 1965).
H. R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1966).
S. REP. NO. 88-1219, agency cmt. to S. 1666, subsec. (c) (1964).
111 CONG. REC. 26820, at 26823 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1965).
H. R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1966).
See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2369 (2019) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
166

167
168
169
170
171
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B. Exemptions Narrowly Construed: FCC v. AT&T
As the Argus Leader argued, a substantial harm standard should be
implemented to ensure Exemption 4 is narrowly construed. 172 In its brief,
the Argus Leader argued that the Supreme Court should “adopt a
‘substantial competitive harm’ requirement as a matter of policy because it
believes FOIA exemptions should be narrowly construed.” 173 Justice
Gorsuch refused to do so, reasoning that the Court could not
“properly expand Exemption 4 beyond what its terms permit” and could
not “arbitrarily constrict it either by adding limitations found nowhere in its
terms.” 174
However, in its 2011 decision in Federal Communications
Commission v. AT&T Inc., the Supreme Court did constrict the scope of
Exemption 7(C), 175 which permits agencies to withhold “personal”
information contained within law enforcement records under certain
conditions. 176 Exemption 7(C) applies specifically to “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.” 177
The case arose from a FOIA request by CompTel, a trade organization
representing competitors of AT&T, seeking “[a]ll pleadings and
correspondence” related to the Federal Communications Commission’s
(FCC) Enforcement Bureau’s investigation into AT&T. 178 The investigation
was launched after the company “voluntarily reported to the FCC that it
might have overcharged the Government for services it provided” as part of
the FCC-administered Education Rate program, which was meant to
enhance access for schools and libraries to telecommunications and
information services. 179 As part of the investigation, AT&T provided
“various documents, including responses to interrogatories, invoices, emails with pricing and billing information, names and job descriptions of
employees involved, and [the company’s] assessment of whether those
employees had violated the company’s code of conduct.” 180 The FCC and
AT&T later reached a resolution in December 2004 in which AT&T,
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Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 46.
Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct. at 2360.
Id. at 2366.
See Fed. Comm. Comm’n v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 409 (2011).
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without conceding liability, agreed to pay the government $500,000 and
“institute a plan to ensure compliance with the program.” 181
AT&T argued that the FCC “could not lawfully release documents
obtained during the course of an investigation into an alleged overcharging
on the ground that disclosure would likely invade the company’s ‘personal
privacy.’” 182
Regarding CompTel’s FOIA request, the FCC Enforcement Bureau
raised the argument that Exemption 4 protected from disclosure some of
the information provided by AT&T, 183 specifically regarding the “cost and
pricing data, billing-related information, and identifying information about
staff, contractors, and customer representatives.” 184 The Bureau also
decided to withhold information under Exemption 7(C), but only
information “[pertaining to] individuals identified in [AT&T’s] submission”
because they have “privacy rights” protected by Exemption 7(C). 185 The
Bureau found that Exemption 7(C) did not apply to AT&T itself, reasoning
that “businesses do not possess ‘personal privacy’ interests as required [by
the exemption].” 186 On review, the FCC agreed with the Bureau’s findings,
concluding that AT&T’s argument that it was a “private corporate citizen”
with personal privacy rights within the meaning of Exemption 7(C) was “at
odds with established [FCC] and judicial precedent.” 187
The Third Circuit ultimately held that Exemption 7(C)
“unambiguously indicates that a corporation may have a ‘personal privacy’
interest within the meaning of Exemption 7(C).” 188 The court accepted
AT&T’s argument that “the plain text of Exemption 7(C) indicates that it
applies to corporations. After all, ‘personal’ is the adjectival form of
‘person,’ and FOIA defines ‘person’ to include a corporation.” 189 The Third
Circuit added, “It would be very odd indeed for an adjectival form of a
defined term not to refer back to that defined term. Further, FOIA’s
exemptions indicate that Congress knew how to refer solely to human

181

Id.

AT&T, Inc. v. Federal Comm. Comm’n, 582 F.3d 490, 492 (3d Cir. 2009). The court
added that AT&T “submitted a letter to the Bureau opposing CompTel’s request, arguing
that the FCC collected the documents that AT&T produced for law enforcement purposes
and therefore that the FCC regulations implementing FOIA’s exemptions prohibited
disclosure.” Id. at 439.
Brief for Respondents at 16, AT&T, Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 582 F.3d 490 (3d Cir.
2009) (No. 09-1279).
AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. at 401.
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beings (to the exclusion of corporations and other legal entities) when it
wanted to.” 190
AT&T argued that the Supreme Court should uphold the Third
Circuit’s ruling, contending that the word “personal” in Exemption 7(C)
“incorporates the statutory definition of ‘person,’” which includes
corporations. 191 AT&T also asserted that “its reading of ‘personal’ [was]
supported by the common legal usage of the word ‘person.’” 192 AT&T
further contended that the Supreme Court had previously “recognized
‘privacy’ interests of corporations in the Fourth Amendment and double
jeopardy contexts.” 193
The Supreme Court held that corporations “do not have ‘personal
privacy’ for the purposes of Exemption 7(C),” reversing the ruling of the
Third Circuit. 194 Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the
unanimous court and first rejected AT&T’s argument that the word
“personal” in Exemption 7(C) incorporates the statutory definition of
“person,” which includes corporations. 195 He reasoned that “a noun and its
adjective form may have meanings as disparate as any two unrelated words”
and agreed with the FCC that “‘personal’ does not, in fact, derive from the
English word ‘person,’ but instead developed along its own etymological
path.” 196
Chief Justice Roberts further held that because “personal” was not
defined in the statute, the Court needed to give the phrase “personal
privacy” “its ordinary meaning.” 197 He concluded that “[p]eople do not
generally use terms such as personal characteristics or personal
correspondence to describe the characteristics or correspondence of
corporations.” 198 Chief Justice Roberts added that “personal privacy . . .
suggests a type of privacy evocative of human concerns—not the sort usually
associated with an entity like AT&T.” 199
Chief Justice Roberts also looked to dictionary definitions of
“personal,” finding that the term “does not ordinarily relate to artificial
190
191
192
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Id. (citation omitted).
AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. at 402.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 403.
Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010)).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398. Chief Justice Roberts continued, “Certainly, if the chief executive officer of a

corporation approached the chief financial officer and said, ‘I have something personal to
tell you,’ we would not assume the CEO was about to discuss company business. Responding
to a request for information, an individual might say, ‘that’s personal.’ . . . In fact, we often
use the word ‘personal’ to mean precisely the opposite of business related: We speak of
personal expenses and business expenses, personal life and work life, personal opinion and
a company’s view.” Id. at 403–04.
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‘persons’ such as corporations.” 200 Additionally, he turned to the context of
the statutory language, holding that the phrase “personal privacy” has a
“more particular meaning than those words in isolation.” 201
Lastly, Chief Justice Roberts rejected AT&T’s argument that the Court
should recognize the privacy interest of corporations regarding Exemption
7(C) just as it did in “the Fourth Amendment and double jeopardy
contexts.” 202 He reasoned that the present case did not require the Court to
rule “on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter of
constitutional or common law.” 203 Instead, the Court only needed to rule on
“[t]he discrete question [of] whether Congress used the term ‘personal
privacy’ to refer to the privacy of artificial persons in FOIA Exemption
7(C).” 204 The Court held that AT&T had provided the Court with “no sound
reason in the statutory text or context to disregard the ordinary meaning of
the phrase ‘personal privacy.’” 205
Chief Justice Roberts also explained that Exemption 4 “clearly applies
to corporations,” adding that Congress “did not use any language similar to
that in Exemption 4 in Exemption 7(C). 206 Chief Justice Roberts also noted
that the Court had “regularly referred to Exemption 6 207 as involving an
‘individual’s right of privacy’” and that it contained the same phrase—
“personal privacy”—as Exemption 7(C). 208 Thus, in this case, the Supreme
Court drew a line, holding that although Exemption 4 applied to, and could
be used by, corporations, Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C) did not.
Whereas the majority in Food Marketing Institute used dictionary
definitions of the statutory language to increase the scope of the material
covered by Exemption 4 by rejecting a harm requirement, 209 the unanimous
court in AT&T, Inc. read the statutory language to restrict the scope of
Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C), preventing AT&T and other
corporations from trying to invoke an exemption that Congress did not
intend to apply to corporations. 210
In a 2011 article in the Duquesne Business Law Journal, Josh Brick
argued that the Court’s ruling in AT&T, Inc. was “in alignment with its
previous observation that there is a strong presumption in favor of
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disclosure under FOIA.” 211 He continued, “When read alongside
Exemption 4 and Exception 6, it is evident that Congress did not view
corporations as possessing an interest in personal privacy,” therefore
narrowly interpreting Exemption 7(C). 212
However, in a 2011 article for CommLaw Conspectus, Maeve E.
Huggins observed that the Court had also failed to address several key
issues, providing little discussion, if any, regarding newsgathering and
transparency. 213 She wrote:
FOIA is a crucial tool of journalists. Any impact on FOIA will
undoubtedly change the way journalists obtain information from
the government and monitor the [federal] government’s
investigative and enforcement responses to wrongdoing. . . . As a
matter of public policy, courts must preserve and protect FOIA
as an effective means to “ensure an informed citizenry.” 214
Huggins added that in AT&T, Inc., the Court “failed to seize an opportunity
to reaffirm the important values of government transparency and
accountability in the face of private interests.” 215 As the following section
argues, the Court put these values at risk in Food Marketing Institute.
Congressional action is required to ensure Exemption 4 is narrowly
construed.

C. Congressional Action Needed to Protect Newsgathering, Transparency,
and the Free Flow of Information
A second reason for Congressional action following Food Marketing
Institute is that the Court, by shielding from disclosure an even broader
range of materials under Exemption 4, makes it more difficult for the press
and the public to obtain information about the government and the
organizations with which it does business. The result is decreased
government transparency and accountability as the press and public are able
to receive and disseminate less information about these transactions, even if
that information is of public concern.
It is important to note that Food Marketing Institute was not about a
secret, proprietary formula or about sensitive information implicating
Josh Brick, Case Note, The United States Supreme Court Holds that Exemption 7(C) of
the Freedom of Information Act Does Not Apply to Corporations: FCC v. AT&T Inc., 14

211
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http://sites.law.duq.edu/blj/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/brick.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ2A-Z9DD].
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business competition. 216 This case, in fact, arose from private companies
working together with the government, raising important implications for
government accountability. Additionally, the Argus Leader was investigating
the practice of “trafficking” of benefits by SNAP recipients, demonstrating
that there were issues of fraud, clearly constituting matters of significant
public concern. 217
This article does not argue for the elimination of Exemption 4 because
important interests do arise, justifying withholding propriety information or
records whose disclosure would have significant effects on businesses’ ability
to compete in the marketplace. In some instances, however, records that
are subject to Exemption 4 transcend these types of situations, implicating
matters of public concern. In such cases, especially where harm to
businesses is unlikely and harm to the public is likely, the press and the
public need access to relevant information to “know what their government
is up to” and hold the government accountable. 218

D. Congress Has Introduced a Possible Solution
Congress has already considered a piece of bipartisan legislation that
can help accomplish those desired outcomes. On July 23, 2019, U.S.
Senators Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa.), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), John Cornyn (RTexas), and Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) introduced The Open and
Responsive Government Act of 2019 (S. 2220). 219 S. 2220, which, in early
2020, remained in the Committee on the Judiciary, would add language to
Exemption 4 to require that the term “confidential” include “information
that, if disclosed, would likely cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the person from whom the information was obtained.” 220 The
See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2360–61 (2019) (indicating
the case involved the disclosure of store-level SNAP data).
Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 3–4.
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773–
74 (1989) (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80, 93 (1973) (Douglas J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted)). Justice Stevens cited Justice Douglas’s dissent in which he contended that the
philosophy behind FOIA was “the principle that a democracy cannot function unless the
people are permitted to know what their government is up to.” Id.
Open and Responsive Government Act of 2019, S. 2220, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2220/text [https://perma.cc/P49CEQHS]; see also Beryl Lipton, Senate Introduces Legislation to Clarify Presumption of
Disclosure
in
FOIA,
MUCKROCK
(June
24,
2019),
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2019/jul/24/Senate-FOIA-bill-b4/
[https://perma.cc/4P9S-356N].
Open and Responsive Government Act of 2019, S. 2220, 116th Cong. § 2(1) (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2220/text [https://perma.cc/P49CEQHS]. The new language under Exemption 4 would read, “(4) trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,
provided that the term ‘confidential’ means information that, if disclosed, would likely cause
216
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bill would incorporate the National Parks harm requirement as part of
Exemption 4 and would, therefore, formally incorporate into the statutory
language what was previously common law under circuit court rulings.
The bill also clarifies that Exemption 4 would “not authorize the
withholding of a portion of an otherwise responsive record on the basis that
the portion is non-responsive.” 221 The Hill had previously reported on June
25, 2019 that, without a public comment period, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) approved a new rule that allowed EPA officials to
review all materials that fit a FOIA request criteria, known as “responsive
documents,” and then decide “whether to release or withhold a record or a
portion of a record on the basis of responsiveness or under one or more
exemptions under the FOIA, and to issue ‘no records’ responses,”
prompting concern from observers, who called for Congress to intervene. 222
In a July 23, 2019 press release, Senator Grassley contended that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Food Marketing Institute, by setting aside the
National Parks standard, “significantly” broadened the scope of Exemption
4. 223 He argued that such a ruling made it “more difficult for the media and
general public to learn about government programs and hold accountable
those who administer them.” 224 This prompted bipartisan support to
“update[] FOIA Exemption 4 to include key accountability language from
National Parks, ensuring continued access to information.” 225
In the press release, Senator Grassley further explained the reasoning
behind the bill:
The people’s business ought to be available to the people. It’s
only through public oversight and transparency that we ensure
government programs are operating as intended, without any
waste, fraud, or abuse. Transparency is something worth fighting
for, and it seems we’re always in an uphill battle to keep the
sunlight shining on government. This balanced and bipartisan bill
responds to recent court rulings and regulatory actions, restoring
pro-transparency principles and making crystal clear where
Congress stands on the public’s right to know.” 226
substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was
obtained.” Id.
Id. § 2(2).
Miranda Green, New EPA rule could expand number of Trump officials weighing in on
FOIA requests, HILL (June 25, 2019, 9:50 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/450169-new-epa-rule-would-allow-more-administration-officials-to-weigh-inon-foia-requests [https://perma.cc/93R8-2ZM4].
Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley, Leahy, Cornyn, Feinstein Introduce Bill to
Reinforce Transparency in Wake of Supreme Court FOIA Decision and Recent Regulations
(July 23, 2019), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-leahy-cornynfeinstein-introduce-bill-reinforce-transparency-wake [https://perma.cc/HEQ3-6CQ3].
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Senator Leahy agreed, adding that the bill would “limit the extent to which the
government can use a recent Supreme Court opinion to justify abuses of a
particular FOIA exemption to withhold information.” 227
In a September 19, 2019, letter to U.S. Senators, the Campaign for
Accountability, a nonprofit government watchdog organization, along with
34 other civil society organizations, including the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), called for the endorsement of S. 2220, particularly the
provision that would codify the primary holding of National Parks. 228 In
particular, the letter argued that the Supreme Court had “greatly expanded
[Exemption 4] . . . in such a way that the public may now have access only
to information that is already openly shared.” 229 The letter therefore called
for Congress to amend FOIA to include the finding in National Parks that
commercial information is exempt as confidential only if disclosure of such
records would be likely to cause substantial harm. 230
S. 2220, by amending FOIA to include such a requirement, would
clarify and provide meaningful resolution to the debate around this issue.
Although the majority in Food Marketing Institute declined to create such
a standard, incorporating a harm requirement would, as the Argus Leader
contended, 231 help narrow the scope of Exemption 4. At the very least, the
result would be that more information would be disclosed about the
business government agencies conduct with public and private
organizations, even if trade secrets and other confidential commercial
information are at issue. Congress would also be within the bounds of
FOIA’s foreseeable harms standard, as asserted by RCFP and others. 232
S. 2220, or a bill like it, would encourage public access to information,
as well as enhance the ability of the press not only to obtain and disseminate
information of public concern, but also to provide greater accountability of
the government and the private actors with whom they work. Not only is
such Congressional action is needed, it is also clearly possible, as
demonstrated by S. 2220.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Food Marketing Institute, on the surface, helps to protect
proprietary information under Exemption 4, it raises issues that require
Congressional action. First, the Court reversed circuit-level precedent dating
227
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back to 1974 that had held that Exemption 4 required a showing of harm in
order to prevent disclosure of requested materials. Because the legislative
history behind such a requirement is ambiguous, Congress needs to step in
to help resolve this critical issue by clarifying that such a demonstration of
harm is necessary under the statutory language.
Second, this article argues that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Food
Marketing Institute broadened the scope of Exemption 4 to include
information that would clearly be of a public interest, therefore limiting
newsgathering and the free flow of information. Narrow categories of
records, such as a secret formula or information directly affecting
businesses’ competitiveness in the marketplace, should remain protected
from disclosure. However, in situations like those arising in Food Marketing
Institute, where the information at issue clearly details the workings of
government agencies and is of public concern, disclosure is essential.
Because the Supreme Court curtailed the free flow of such information with
its decision, Congressional action is needed to ensure that Exemption 4
does not limit newsgathering and government transparency.
Significantly, Congress has already considered legislation that would
achieve the resolution discussed above. S. 2220 would formally incorporate
the substantial harm test, helping to clarify the harm requirement in a way
that would help promote broader disclosure of information related to
Exemption 4, providing an adequate resolution to the concerns raised by
Food Marketing Institute. Congress has demonstrated that it recognizes and
has the ability to act on key issues raised following the Supreme Court’s
ruling. This formal change would ensure that, at least in cases arising around
Exemption 4 of FOIA, newsgathering, transparency, and the free flow of
information are promoted and protected.
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